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Abstract 
 God’s temporality is still debated today by theologians and philosophers 
with whether God is temporal, atemporal, or some other form of temporality. The 
context of this paper is the topic of God’s timelessness with the idea of William 
Lane Craig’s idea of “omnitemporality.” The paper discusses a few of the major 
arguments for God’s temporality and also God’s timelessness. The paper then 
analyzes Craig’s article defending the omnitemporality of God declaring that God 
is non-temporal without creation and then becomes temporal with creation. 
Though this idea may seem as a possible solution to the question of God’s 
temporality, it fails to follow with the Kalam argument and the relationship of 
time and change, for any possibility of change requires some duration of time. 
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Introduction 
  There are many attributes that people ascribe to a supreme being; the 
attribute of timelessness is one of them. Temporality is understood as the mode of 
existence of an object that is in time.1 Many philosophers have debated the issue 
of God’s timelessness and temporality, whether he is temporal, non-temporal, or 
some other possible form. Recently, William Lane Craig has published a paper 
where he defends the idea that God is “omnitemporal”: God is able to change 
from non-temporality to temporality in the creation of time. However, with the 
attribute of timelessness, the idea that God is non-temporal without creation and 
temporal with creation fails to adhere to the Kalam cosmological argument and 
the relationship between time and change.  
Analysis 
 In the article “Timelessness and Omnitemporality,” William Lane Craig 
defends the idea that God is non-temporal without creation and temporal since 
creation. He begins his argument with the explanation of divine timelessness. One 
of the most important arguments that supports divine timelessness is the claim 
                                                 
1
 Garrett DeWeese, "Atemporal, Sempiternal, or Omnitemporal: God's Temporal Mode of Being," 
in God and Time Essays on the Divine Nature (New York: Oxford University Press 
2002), 50. 
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that the fleeting nature of a temporal life is incompatible with the life of a most 
perfect being.2 The argument for this claim is as follows: 
1. God is the most perfect being. 
2. The most perfect being has the most perfect mode of existence. 
3. Temporal existence is a less perfect mode of existence than a timeless 
existence. 
4. Therefore God has the most perfect mode of existence 
5. Therefore God has a timeless mode of existence.3 
The premises of this argument rely on the notion of the loss that comes through 
the experience of temporal passage. In another paper by Craig entitled “The 
Elimination of Absolute Time by the Special Theory of Relativity,” Craig states 
that whether an individual believes that God exists temporally or atemporally is 
apt to depend on whether the individual believes that time is dynamic or static.4 
The dynamic view of time, which is referred to as “A-theory,” defends that time 
flow is objectively real. The static view of time, referred to as “B-theory,” implies 
that the flow of time is an illusion; the present does not move, but time is merely 
subjective.5 Craig explains that some philosophers argue for the static or tenseless 
                                                 
2
 Craig, William Lane. "Timelessness & Omnitemporality." in God & Time Four Views (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press 2001), 132. 
3
 Ibid. 133. 
4
 Craig, William Lane. "The Elimination of Absolute Time by the Special Theory of Relativity." in 
God and Time Essays on the Divine Nature  (New York: Oxford University Press 2002),  132. 
5
 "Time." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed April 11, 2015. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/time/. 
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view of time, according to which the past and future are just as real as the present, 
and the passing of time is explained as a subjective illusion of human 
consciousness. With this view of “tenseless,” a temporal God would exist at all 
temporal locations without beginning or end to his temporal extension. Though 
this view may seem plausible, it fails to appreciate that it is based on the 
experience of temporal passage rather than the objective reality of temporal 
passage itself.6 The fact remains with a temporal being: the past is lost and the 
future is not accessible to the temporal being. 
 After the brief discussion of divine timelessness, Craig begins to explain 
the arguments for divine temporality. One of the arguments is that since the 
Christian God is a personal being, God must be a temporal being in order to be a 
person, for it is argued that a person must have certain properties that inherently 
involve time7.  
Another argument concerns the divine relations with the world. This 
argument is summarized as follows: 
1. God is creatively active in the temporal world. 
2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really related to 
the temporal world. 
3. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal. 
                                                 
6
 Craig, William Lane. "Timelessness & Omnitemporality." in God & Time Four Views (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press 2001), 134. 
7
 Ibid. 137. 
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4. Therefore God is temporal.8  
This argument initiates a standard belief that in order for God to relate to the 
temporal world, then God must undergo extrinsic change. To explain this further, 
at the first moment of time God would be in a new relation in which He would not 
have been before (since there was no “before”). In the creation of time, God 
would undergo an extrinsic change because He comes into the relation of 
sustaining the universe or possibly coexisting with the universe, which relations 
had not existed before.9 Lastly, Craig argues for a third argument for divine 
temporality from divine knowledge of tensed facts. It is argued by some that a 
timeless God cannot know certain tensed facts about the world (for example, what 
is happening now) and therefore, since God is omniscient, He must be temporal.10 
Tensed facts are defined with the function to locate something in relation to the 
present. 11  
This argument is summarized as follows: 
1. A temporal world exists. 
2. God is omniscient. 
3. If a temporal world exists, then God is omniscient, God knows tensed 
facts. 
                                                 
8
 Craig, William Lane. "Timelessness & Omnitemporality." in God & Time Four Views (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press 2001) 141. 
9
 Ibid. 140-141. 
10
 Ibid. 145. 
11
 Ibid. 145. 
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4. If God is timeless, He does not know tensed facts. 
5. Therefore, God is not timeless.12 
Both of the arguments for divine timelessness and divine temporality are strong 
and are still debated today by many philosophers such as Alan Padgett, Garrett 
DeWeese, Brian Leftow, and Delmas Lewis. These arguments show the difficulty 
in the attempt to describe God’s relation to time, whether He is temporal or non-
temporal.  
 After explaining the two sides of this debate, Craig defends his notion of 
“omnitemporality.” Several statements are declared: first, that God exists in time; 
second, time had a beginning; and third, God did not have a beginning.13 It is 
difficult to merge these statements, for if time began to exist, then God must have 
existed beyond the beginning of time. God must therefore have been changeless 
in that state, for change requires time. Furthermore, this state cannot exist before 
the creation of time in a temporal sense. God must be causally, but not 
temporally, before the creation of the universe and time. When God created the 
universe, God entered into time at the moment of creation in virtue of His real 
relations with the created order. Thus Craig concludes that God must be timeless 
                                                 
12
 Craig, William Lane. "Timelessness & Omnitemporality." in God & Time Four Views (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press 2001) 145. 
13
 Ibid. 156. 
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without the universe and temporal with the universe.14 As God exists without 
creation, there are no temporal states such as before, or after, or any temporal 
passage or future phase: there is just God. 15 However, to state that time exists 
before the beginning of the world (a “timeless” phase before the creation of time) 
constitutes a problem with a backward causation (which has an effect occurring 
before its cause) for the occurrence of the first event causes time to exist not only 
with the event but also before it.16 Craig uses an analogy of the possible creation 
of the universe by the Big Bang and how it is not considered to be part of time but 
to constitute a boundary to time, but it is considered to be causally connected to 
the universe. By following this analogy, Craig offers the idea that God’s timeless 
eternity is a boundary of time that is causally, but not temporally prior to the 
creation of the universe.17 
Response 
 All of the previous arguments for the temporality of God make it difficult 
to determine whether God is in time or is timeless. However, Craig’s argument 
for God’s omnitemporality with God without time without creation and becomes 
temporal with creation does not satisfy the debate, for the argument is 
                                                 
14
 Craig, William Lane. "Timelessness & Omnitemporality." in God & Time Four Views (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press 2001) 156. 
15
 Ibid 156. 
16
 Ibid. 159. 
17
 Ibid. 160.  
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inconsistent. In his article, "God, Time and the Kalam Cosmological Argument" 
Christopher Bobier argues that Craig must either abandon his view of God’s 
relationship to time or the Kalam argument. William Lane Craig presents the 
Kalam argument as follows: 
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. 
2. The universe began to exist. 
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.18 
In regards to William Lane Craig’s idea on God’s relationship to time, Wes 
Morrison defines Craig’s view as: “Qua creator of the temporal universe, God is 
eternal in the sense of ‘atemporal.’ But now that there is a temporal universe, God 
exists at every time – past, present, and future.”19 However, Bobier defends that if 
one affirms both the Kalam Argument and Craig’s view on God’s 
omnitemporality, then it follows that either God has a cause or the Kalam 
Argument is unsound.20  
To begin his argument, Bobier starts with premise 1 and tries to discover a 
satisfactory account of what it means for an object to “begin to exist.” However, 
                                                 
18
 Bobier, Christopher Alan. "God, Time and the Kalam Cosmological Argument." Sophia Vol. 
52, no. 4 (2013): 593-600. Accessed March 6, 2015.  593. 
http://link.springer.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/article/10.1007/s11841-013-0362-4.  593. 
19
 Morriston, Wes. “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical 
Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Faith and Philosophy, 17(2), 149–169.  151. 
20
 Bobier, Christopher Alan. "God, Time and the Kalam Cosmological Argument." Sophia Vol. 
52, no. 4 (2013): 593-600. Accessed March 6, 2015.  594. 
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with every account that Craig offers there still seems to be the conclusion that 
either the Kalam Argument is unsound or God has a cause. The first account that 
was given for the “begins to exist” (BTE) is as follows: 
BTE) X begins to exist at t1 if there is an earlier time immediately prior at 
which X did not exist.21 
It is argued that those who affirm the Kalam Argument cannot affirm this first 
BTE. If this first BTE is true with the universe to begin to exist, then there must 
be a time “prior” to the creation at which the universe did not exist. But, 
according to Craig’s view, time was created along with the creation of the 
universe so there is no time “prior to” the creation. The creation of the universe 
combined with Craig’s view does not satisfy BTE, and therefore would suggest 
that the Kalam Argument is unsound.22 In order to resolve these problems, Craig 
has revised the BTE in order to try to make it conform to the Kalam Argument. 
One of his next revisions was BTE2 which is as follows: 
BTE2) X begins to exist at t1 if (i) x exists at t1 and (ii) there is no time 
prior to t1 at which x exists.23 
Unfortunately, this version is not effective either for if it were correct, according 
to Craig’s view, in the creation of the universe God also created time; so define 
                                                 
21
 Bobier, Christopher Alan. "God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument." Sophia Vol. 
52, no. 4 (2013): 593-600. Accessed March 6, 2015.  595. 
22
 Ibid. 595. 
23
 Ibid. 596. 
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the first moment of time be “t1” for the rest of this paper. God entered into time at 
t1 and thus had a first moment of time. But, since God entered into time at the first 
moment, there was no earlier time at which God would have existed. Time did not 
exist prior to t1 (the first moment of time) and thus God did not exist at any time 
“prior to” t1. Therefore it concludes with BTE2 that God begins to exist and 
according to the first premise of the Kalam Argument, God must have a cause.24 
There are a few other accounts for the BTE argument but each has had some 
aspect of the argument that either has God have a cause or the makes the Kalam 
Argument unsound. The recent account is BTE4 which is as follows: 
BTE4) X begins to exist at t1 if (i) x exists at t1; (ii) t is either the first time 
at which x exists or is separated from any time t*<t at which x existed by a 
nondegenerate, temporal interval; (iii) x’s existing at t1 is a tensed fact.25 
Again, if BTE4 is true, then it leads to the question of whether God’s existing at t1 
is a tensed fact. When God entered into time, according to Craig, then God 
experienced a first moment in time: let this be t1, and one says that prior to t1, God 
exists timelessly. However, God existing at t1 is a tensed fact.  It is a fact that at t1, 
God exists now. Therefore, with BTE4, God exists at t1, t1 is the first time at 
                                                 
24
 Bobier, Christopher Alan. "God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument." Sophia Vol. 
52, no. 4 (2013): 593-600. Accessed March 6, 2015.  596. 
25
 Ibid. 598-599. 
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which God exists, and his existence at t1 is a tensed fact.26 So it concludes again, 
as with all of the BTE accounts, that either God has a cause for his existence or 
the Kalam Argument is again unsound. Bobier states that an individual who 
affirms the Kalam Argument precludes the individual from affirming that God is 
outside of time without creation and temporal with it; for if one affirmed Craig’s 
view of omnitemporality then the person cannot offer the Kalam Argument, for 
the person will have to undermine the view that God is uncreated.27 In a review of 
"Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time” Merrit Quarum asks 
the question of whether God chose to destroy the universe and also time 
(temporality), would that then make God timeless? With the view of 
“omnitemporality” that Craig provides, how would he be able to answer this? 
God’s role in creating and possibly submitting Himself into time has significant 
philosophical and theological implications in regards to God’s omnipresent, 
omniscience, and omnipotence.28 
 In “God and Time Four Views” Alan G. Padgett responded to William 
Lane Craig’s paper on God’s omnitemporality on the argument that if God is 
timeless before creation then it would be impossible for God to change and 
                                                 
26
 Bobier, Christopher Alan. "God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument." Sophia Vol. 
52, no. 4 (2013): 593-600. Accessed March 6, 2015. 599. 
27
 Ibid. 600. 
28
 Quarum, Merrit. "Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time." Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 46, no. 4 (12, 2003): 746-9, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/211206278?accountid=12085. 749. 
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become temporal with creation. The argument is centered on the idea that for a 
change to occur, a duration, or interval of time, must also occur. He begins his 
argument is as follows:  
1. Necessarily, if no duration occurs then no change occurs.   
2. Necessarily, if a change occurs then duration occurs.  
3. If a duration occurs, then it must be the case that a change does not occur 
(at that time). 
Padgett introduced proposition 3 in order to argue it false. Proposition 3 obviously 
contradicts proposition 2.  
So he introduces the final part of the argument: 
4. If a duration occurs, then it might be the case that a change occurs. 
5. If no duration occurs, then it is not possible for a change to occur. 
6. If possibly a change occurs then duration occurs.29  
He shows that time is the dimension of the possibility of change. Change does not 
have to happen in order for time to happen, but the possibility of change follows 
from time.30 Following from Proposition 5, since it is impossible for change to 
occur if there is no duration, then it is impossible for a world to be both fully 
timeless and have the possibility of change to occur. With Padgett’s argument, it 
argues that in Craig’s view that God is timeless without creation and then become 
temporal with creation, that it is impossible for God to change if He is truly 
                                                 
29
 Padgett, Alan G. "Response to William Lane Craig." in God & Time Four Views (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2001) 168-169. 
30
 Ibid. 168. 
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timeless. Padgett concludes that since God has the possibility of change and has 
had it even before creation that God is and has been temporal in some sense.31   
Conclusion 
In regards to the question of the temporality of God, there are various 
evidences used in the arguments for the different possible temporalities of God. 
The philosophical arguments debate the temporality of God with the premises of 
God’s perfect mode of existence, the relationship to the temporal world, and also 
God’s omniscience. At first it seems that William Lane Craig’s hybrid view of 
God’s relationship to time, that of “omnitemporality” may hold possible answers 
to the long debate of the temporality of God. However, with Craig’s argument for 
God’s “omnitemporality,” there seems to be enough evidence to support the view 
that it is inconsistent in that it does not correspond to the Kalam Argument nor to 
the relationship between time, or duration, and the possibility of change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Ibid. 169. 
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